Back-up and recovery of IRMA attributes

Master Thesis Project

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Introduction

- Research done in cooperation with Alliander
- Goal: solve a frequently asked question about IRMA

  What happens when a user gets a new device?

- Currently, all attributes have to be re-collected manually
- Can we do better?

Relevant scenarios

1. New device; old device still working
2. New device; old device broken
3. New device; old device lost/stolen

Take the easy road (1)

Why not use the default recovery functionality (like WhatsApp)?

- Android back-up to Google Drive
- iCloud back-up for iOS

Google Drive

iCloud

Problems:

- Personal data and keys stored at servers of Google and Apple
- Storage parties might be able to impersonate a user
- User cannot block lost phones
- Only entering a password is weak authentication mechanism
- Identity can be copied multiple times

Take the easy road (2)

Why not re-collect all credentials, via some renewal script?

Problem:

Involves many re-authentications, this is much work for the user

Important criteria for a proper recovery solution

- User should be in exclusive control of recovery
- Recovery should be possible for the original user
- Procedures should be understandable and usable
- IRMA's privacy and security guarantees should be maintained
- It should be clear which parties are involved
- Users should not become dependent on a single cloud provider

Proof-of-concept (PoC) that we designed:

- IRMA app's data is stored in back-up
- Back-up can be restored on new device
- Old device is blocked

Elements we focus on:

1. How can the back-up be secured?
2. How can old devices be blocked?



1. Make back-ups secure

- Wherever a back-up is stored, it should be secure and encrypted
- User data should be encrypted before it leaves the IRMA app
- The user should have control over the decryption key

Big question: how can a user safely store a decryption key of the back-up

- Storing it digitally may not be transparent enough
- Storing it at a central party gives a fake notion of control
- Secret sharing is a complicated process

A solution is to store the key physically, on paper
→ Two-factor authentication

1. Make back-ups secure (technical)

In our proof-of-concept the back-up is encrypted twice for two-factor authentication

- A user key
  - Stored by the user

- A public key of the keyshare server
  - Is involved to check the user's PIN code
  - Back-up can only be decrypted when keyshare server participates



In our PoC: user key as mnemonic phrase

- Known from Bitcoin wallets
- List of 12 words is generated randomly
- Order of words is important
- Selected from word list of 2048 words
  - Selected to be easy and sufficiently unique
  - First four characters are identifying for a word
  - Available in multiple languages, can easily be extended



In our PoC: user key as mnemonic phrase

Advantages:

- Is understandable for every user
- No additional technology is needed

Disadvantages:

- Writing a phrase down and entering it back in requires some time
- User might make mistakes when writing it down
  - User interface can help to prevent mistakes



2. Device revocation

IRMA account on old devices should be blocked when transferring IRMA account

Multiple reasons:

- Prevent usage of credentials without permission of user
- Prevent that credentials spread out
  - Multiple devices might have exact the same credentials (copies)
  - Possibility for users to lend out credentials
  - Link between user and device becomes weaker
- Legal reasons (eIDAS requirements)

In our PoC: device revocation via keyshare server

- In every IRMA session the user's PIN is checked by the keyshare server
- Without PIN approval of the keyshare server nothing can be done
- It can also efficiently enforce device revocation
  → An additional check can be built-in to check whether the used device is still valid

When device is revoked:

- IRMA app cannot be opened anymore on that device
- Disclosure, issuance and signing sessions cannot be completed using that device

In our PoC: device revocation via keyshare server (technical)

- We do this by adding a device key
  - Shared key between IRMA app containing the active IRMA account and the keyshare server
  - Sessions with the keyshare server can only be made valid knowing the device key

When recovery process is started on new device:

1. User authenticates by entering his PIN
2. New device and keyshare server agree on new device key
3. Keyshare server deletes previous device's key
4. Keyshare server helps decrypting the back-up

Demo

Setting up recovery









Constructing a back-up







Opening the app on a new device



Recovery process